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Abstract 
Over the past decade, the PRC has made dramatic changes to its labor 
contract laws, corporate laws, and social welfare system in an effort to improve 
workers' wellbeing and decrease the impact of rights violations on the public 
healthcare system and national budget. This paper seeks to determine the effect of 
changes in social welfare policy made in 2003 on workplace injuries and illness in 
light of the domestic job growth that took place at that time. In 2003, changes in 
marketplace behavior, corporate law, and enterprise management policy led to a 
trend break in employment, wages, and insurance coverage (Kato). The 
econometric model described in this paper measures whether workers’ 
compensation for injuries and diseases incurred at work increased overall due to 
this policy change. To accomplish this, I first determined how each industry is 
experiencing changes in employment and wages. Second, I used province level 
data to determine which industries have experienced changes in work-related 
injury and disease insurance coverage since the policy changes.  Using this 
information, I found evidence that suggests that the workers’ insurance coverage 
improved overall, and that a greater number of workers are being compensated for 
injuries and illnesses incurred at work. Though a smaller proportion of workers 
are insured, more workers are receiving compensation. The study also analyzes 
changes in wages by industry with respect to injury and disease rates, showing 
that workers in the mining industry are paid disproportionately considering their 
risk of disease. The results also show that government workers received a 
significant pay raise due to the policy changes. 
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Introduction and Background 
 Chinese labor law enforcement is a topic of growing importance in today’s 
international economic arena. Recent studies have revealed that many of China’s 
firms are not compensating workers for injuries and illnesses that they acquire at 
work, while others pay unfair wages that fall well below the legal limit. The 
Chinese government has publicly recognized the potential societal costs of 
relaxed law enforcement, including public health problems and stifled economic 
growth. Yang Zhiming, a representative from the Chinese Ministry of Public 
Health, noted that “working health and safety is very problematic [in some 
highly-dangerous and heavily-polluting industries]”(Wang). According to Yang, 
the Chinese government recognizes the need to improve enterprise supervision 
and lower the risk of work-related lung disease for workers in factories and mines 
(Wang).  
Though labor rights organizations advocate for immediate change, it may 
not be economically or culturally practicable to revamp the current law 
enforcement structure. As a developing country, it may be too costly and 
structurally prohibitive to adjust the system through force or economic incentive 
in the short run.  Some experts (Vuylsteke, Kissel, etc.) argue that labor law 
enforcement will inevitably improve as China’s legal infrastructure improves over 
time and as its economy becomes more advanced. Some of these experts also 
suggest that premature efforts to restructure the labor law enforcement system 
would be faced with deeply rooted corruption and might cause economic decline. 
The success of such a project would hinge on economic conditions, workers’ 
participation, firms’ abilities to retaliate, and the public’s desire to change. 
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Given the limitations on our ability to measure cultural receptivity to a 
change in China’s labor law enforcement strategy, it may be beneficial to measure 
the need for greater enforcement in the short run. Of course, the Chinese 
government’s ability and need to enforce its current labor laws depends on how 
job and labor force composition and workers' compensation changes over time.   
With this in mind, I will compare job growth, wages, and work-related injury and 
disease rates across industries to compare the negative and positive effects of 
increasing employment in risk-intensive versus non-risk-intensive industries. In 
particular, I will examine the need for increased enforcement of worker-safety 
codes and compensation.  
This study also seeks to find the effect of the increased insurance coverage 
that resulted from the policy changes implemented in 2003. Though the total 
insurance coverage of workers in this sample increased by 57 million between 
2003 and 2006 (see Figure 1), employment increased by 63 million.  This paper 
seeks to find whether the newly insured workers received benefits at a 
significantly lower rate than workers who were covered before the policy change.  
This will give us insight into whether workers are being adequately compensated 
for injuries and diseases incurred at work. 
This study will look at the effects of these changes in workforce 
composition on work-related injuries/diseases per worker. To determine whether 
Chinese jobs are becoming safer, I will compare the injury rates of marginal jobs 
that are being subtracted from those industries to marginal jobs that are being 
added to growing industries.  As the country’s labor force grows in the coming 
years, it is important to observe the composition of jobs, wages, and worker  
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compensation as new jobs are created in China and its workforce takes on new 
risks. 
Work-related injuries and diseases are estimated using the number of 
insurance beneficiaries by province and year, respectively. Unfortunately the 
insurance data is not sorted by industry, which makes it more difficult to assess 
the effect of an increase in employment or production on injuries/disease in a 
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given industry. Instead, I will use an estimation procedure to determine which 
provinces are dominated by what industries (which is outlined in the 
“econometrics” section below). In effect, the injury and disease data for these 
provinces will represent industry specific data by province and year.  
Because the model uses insurance data to predict work place injuries and 
diseases, it is difficult to determine whether a rise or fall in injury/disease rate was 
caused by a change in insurance coverage or by an actual change in the number of 
diseases or injuries reported. Therefore, the results of this study are suggestive. 
However, I believe that gaining insight into either injury/disease rates or 
insurance coverage will be valuable in measuring how China’s workforce is being 
accommodated. 
The province and industry-level data used in this study was collected by 
the Chinese Bureau of Statistics, and provides information on employment, 
wages, and insurance from 30 provinces between 1998 and 2007.  The results 
exclude Chinese territories, including Macau and Hong Kong, and do not 
encompass the effects of the current economic crisis. 
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A Review of Previous Literature 
Most existing empirical studies on Chinese labor focus on the factory- or 
state-level effects of workplace safety, productivity, and safety (Tsui, China 
Labor Watch, China Labor Bulletin). Other papers give us a comprehensive look 
at how Chinese labor laws and practices are changing in modern China, but rely 
on qualitative analysis (Brown, Brambilla). However, several authors have 
published meaningful and informative qualitative works which have paved the 
way for today’s researchers. China Labour Bulletin, a prolific Hong Kong-based 
NGO, publishes some of the most highly consulted and referenced reports in the 
industry. CLB’s findings tell us that the Chinese government has agreed to follow 
basic ILO labor mandates, and has passed adequate legislature in order to protect 
its workers at a minimal level. However, their work goes on to say that the 
enforcement of these laws continues to fall short, and hundreds of thousands of 
Chinese laborers remain without adequate pay, health benefits, and working 
conditions (Hard Road). Bao Hua, a factory auditor, tells us that brand auditing, 
police services, and other labor law enforcement mechanisms are often rendered 
useless by corruption. Alexandra Harney and Leslie Chang’s field work supports 
these findings, adding knowledge backed by firsthand experience that 
demonstrates the inability of Chinese laborers to bargain effectively, and the 
nature of the dangerous working conditions which can result. The Asia Monitor 
Resource Center, IHLO, and other advocacy groups have made progress in 
determining that migrant workers are affected the most by labor law enforcement, 
while Peerenboom has laid out the economic benefits of labor rights.  Given these 
findings, it is reasonable to assume that a natural study can be conducted to 
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determine the increased welfare (measured by increased wages and heightened 
employment) in a province when the number of factories increases due to an 
outside causal mechanism (the 2003 policy change).  
 My methodology will rely on the use of an econometric model, which will 
estimate the reduced-form effects of the bundle of 2003 policies as they vary 
across different industries. 
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Data 
This study uses statistics gathered from the China Labour Statistical 
Yearbooks and Provincial Yearbooks over the past 12 years, comparing the 
effects of increased product demand on economic indicators at the provincial 
level. These statistics include regional data for employment, wages, and the total 
number of accepted insurance claims for workplace injuries/diseases by year. The 
data was complied by China’s Department of Population and Employment 
Statistics, Department of Planning and Finance, and the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security.  China’s National Bureau of Statistics gathered industry specific 
data at the monthly and yearly level. 
Though the China Labor Statistical Yearbook is considered to be one of 
the best sources of data on China, it is also thought to be flawed. Some of the 
figures in this data set are either missing or presumed to be inaccurate. For 
example, experts believe that estimates for work-related injuries are low due to 
underreporting by both workers and the by government itself (Crandall). 
However, this is also the most accurate source of data that is available and is 
widely used among social scientists who are studying economic growth and labor 
in China. Though the data set may under-report some statistics, I do not believe 
that the inaccuracies within the data set will have a significant impact on my 
results. 
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Limitations of this Study 
 Ideally, I would have had industry – and province- level data on 
employment, wages, insurance, and injury/disease rates. However, the industry-
level employment, injury and disease rates were not available in the China Labor 
Statistical Yearbook.  Instead, I used province level employment data to generate 
industry shares of employment, and province level insurance data to generate 
industry shares of work-related injury and disease beneficiaries
1
. This method is 
described in greater detail under “Econometrics” below. 
The insurance data tells us how many total workers are ensured by year, 
and how many of those workers had their claims for work-related injury or 
disease compensation accepted.  Because I am using insurance data to predict 
changes in diseases and injury, it is impossible to determine whether a change in 
the injury or disease rate is due to changes in insurance policy (i.e. changes in the 
rate at which the insurance companies are accepting claims), or to changes in 
actual injury and disease rate. Therefore, the result of this study is suggestive.   
Key Factors 
 The use of provincial statistics in this study relies on the fact that 
industries, including those used in this regression, are clustered by geography and 
culture, which in this case is best represented by province. The top producers in 
each industry can be separated by industry type (mining, manufacturing, financial 
services etc).I found that firms that produce a certain product tend to cluster 
within provinces that have the resources, workers, entrepreneurs, and favorable 
tax and legal structure to accommodate the industry. Therefore, when examining 
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the effect of increased product and labor demand in a given industry, it is 
appropriate to seek their outcomes at the provincial level.  
 Some industries are especially useful in determining the effects of 
workplace injury and disease, as their jobs are high-risk by nature. Assuming that 
workers are compensated for this risk with higher wages, these sectors are also a 
good indicator of the positive impacts of risky jobs in a given province.  
It is also essential to understand the role of worker behavior in the 
enforcement of labor laws in Mainland China. Workers are often uninformed 
about the true hazards involved in their jobs, such as potential illness and injury. 
Due to these influences, workers may be acting irrationally. Essentially, they will 
take jobs at a lower pay rate than they otherwise would if they were aware of the 
risks. This could potentially have an effect on their likelihood to become injured, 
file a lawsuit, or make a work-related health insurance claim.  
Empirically, labor unions do not make a significant impact on law 
enforcement (Tsui). This is a socially accepted view in China (Cheng, Poon), 
meaning that Chinese citizens and workers are relatively aware that Unions do not 
push legislation or enforcement one way or another. Many believe that unions act 
as the eyes and ears of the government, persuading workers and employers to 
resolve problems in the way that best suits the PRC (Vik, Poon). Therefore, the 
strong presence of unions in all of the sectors being studied (coal, gas, steel, 
apparel, textiles) can influence workers’ behavior. However, it seems as though 
unions are fairly even handed when granting benefits to workers or employers 
overall.  For the purpose of this study, it can be assumed that workers are 
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relatively aware of the risks involved in their jobs, and a worker’s ability to claim 
and receive insurance benefits is unrelated to their contact with unions or their 
knowledge of hazards in the workplace. 
Work place injuries and illness vary by profession and industry, as does 
the regulation of safety procedures and codes. However, in spite the array of 
probabilities associated with a worker’s potential injury, it has been demonstrated 
that many of these ailments are financially efficient to prevent. For the most part, 
there are high returns on investment on accident and disease prevention in the 
workplace regardless of factors such as factory size, workforce composition, and 
product type. Foreign, joint-, and state-owned enterprises tend to go above and 
beyond the minimum legal work safety requirements, and often report that 
precautionary measures are well worth initial investment costs (Gustad).  The 
overall lack of investment is attributed to poor enforcement and undereducated 
factory owners/managers (TAL Group). In this paper, we will assume that proper 
investment in preventative action against injuries/illness would reduce costs for 
firms, workers, and the government. 
Description of Econometrics 
 This analysis uses a 2003 exogenous shock to measure the effect of 
industrial growth on work related injuries/diseases, gross value added, 
employment, and wages. The first stage regression equations are as follows: 
(1) Empt=α0
Emp 
+α1
Emp
•Yeart+α2
Emp 
•Yeart•{ Yeart ≥ 2003}+εt
Emp
 
(2) Outputt=α0
Output 
+α1
Output
•Yeart+α2
Output
•Yeart•{ Yeart ≥ 2003}+εt
Output
 
(3) Injuriest=α0
Injuries 
+α1
Injuries
•Yeart+α2
Injuries
•Yeart•{ Yeart ≥ 2003}+εt
Injuries
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(4) Wagest=α0
Wages 
+α1
Wages
•Yeart+α2
Wages 
•Yeart•{ Yeart ≥ 2003}+εt
Wages
 
with Emp representing employees, Output representing gross industrial value 
added, Wages representing the average wage, and Injuries representing the 
number of work-related illness/injury beneficiaries in a given year t, province j, 
and industry i. Because industry-level data is not available for injury and disease 
rates, we will use the percentage of employees in each industry for a given 
province j, to identify weighted sums of αi0
Injuries
 for each industry i.  These will 
allow us to examine the marginal jobs that resulted from the exogenous shock in 
2003. I will compare work-related injury/disease rates and wages among workers 
who were added as a result of the shock with the average worker. 
 Next, I will try to determine the tradeoffs between wages/growth and 
injuries/disease by looking at differences across industries. Since the injury data is 
available by province but not by industry, I will use provinces that have high 
concentrations of workers from specific industries to estimate the effect of 
working in a particular industry on a worker’s wage or productivity on their risk 
of being injured at work. For example, the agriculture industry is growing at a 
slower rate than electronics manufacturing. This strategy would estimate the 
relative injury rates for marginal workers between these two industries.  The 
underlying model is as follows: 
(5) Injuriesijt=αi0
Injuries 
+αi1
Injuries
•Yeart+αi2
Injuries
•Yeart•〖{ Yeart ≥ 2003}+εijtInjuries 
where coefficients vary by industry and not by province. 
 
(6).
Where  represents the industry shares, which are calculated using a separate data set. These 
shares were interacted with the regressors in models (1)
industry. 
The coefficients on the injury shares represent the industry speci
on , , and
(i.e. the percentage of workers in a certain industry within a given province) to 
find the injury rate of the marginal worker for each industry.  
 Hence, the constant, the
across industries, but remain constant across provinces. Since industry
data was not available for occupational injuries and disease, equations (1)
estimate the alpha coefficients for employment an
province.  Each of these coefficients represents a weighted sum of the industry
specific coefficient, where the weights are determined by the percent of workers 
who work in a particular industry within that province (i.e. the
To recover the industry
province level data set of alpha coefficients (
regresses them on the industry shares (equation (6)).
 The results of this study showed the impact of the 2003 policy changes 
across industries in employment, average wages, insurance coverage, the total 
 
-(4) to measure the effects for each 
.. Then, we will regress  on industry group concentrations 
 
 time trend, and the trend break in 2003 vary 
d injuries separately for each 
 industry share).  
-specific injury coefficients, the second regression uses a 
, ,  by province) and 
 
Results 
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-specific 
-(4) 
-
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number of insurance beneficiaries, and the rate at which insured workers had 
injury and disease claims accepted.  
Overall, I found that there was an increase in employment in all industries 
after 2003 except in farming, which was already following a steady downward 
trend before the policy change. Also, in spite of an upward trend in employment 
after the 2003 policy changes were implemented, the mining industry still had 1.7 
million fewer workers in 2006 than in 1998. See Panel A below for regression 
results:  
 We can see from Table 1 that the farming and mining industries both 
experienced an overall decrease in employees.  The coefficients in column (2), 
which represent a loss of employment in these industries weighted against other 
industries, show that while both industries sustained a decrease in employment, 
mining experienced a far more dramatic decline in employees. Each of these 
changes is likely the result of an improvement in mining and farming technology 
(Yuan), and the movement of Chinese workers away from farm work in Western 
China into higher value-added jobs in eastern China (Chan).   
Among the industries that experienced increased employment after the policy 
change, construction, government, manufacturing, social services, trade, and 
transportation had higher rates of growth compared to other industries. The social 
services sector had an especially large increase in employees relative to other 
industries (see Panel A, Table 2) which can be attributed to the increase in social 
welfare services that was a part of the 2003 policy change. In fact, social services 
had the largest increase in employees of all 22 industries Employment in 
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construction and transportation was also higher than in other industries (see Panel 
A, Table 2), which is likely the result of mass migration from western to central 
and central to eastern China that occurred during and after that time (Chan, Fang). 
Panel A: Industry Regression Results; Year 2003 interacted with Industry Data 
     
Table 1: Selected  Industries (Employment Decrease)  
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
Industry Employees Earnings‡ Average   
      Earnings‡  
     
Farming -150738 -25300000 -10731  
 (12400000) (222000000) (10859)  
     
Mining  -3033669 -115000000 4017  
 (11800000) (213000000) (5229)  
     
R² 0.0375 0.0671 0.8028  
     
Table 2: Selected  Industries (Employment Increase)  
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
Industry Employees Earnings‡ Average   
      Earnings‡  
     
Construction 10700000 404000000 -1711  
 (29200000) (529000000) (12183)  
     
Social Services 33200000 1490000000 -11960  
 (123000000) (2250000000) (34253)  
     
Transportation 5848515 182000000 580  
 (33200000) (609000000) (14418)  
     
R² 0.0375 0.0671 0.8028  
     
Notes: 5 of 22 industries shown, R² was calculated using all 22 industries  
Constant term omitted     
Year interacted with industry shares omitted, Female Employees omitted 
‡ Earnings and Average Earnings are in Yuan; 1 Yuan ≈ 8 USD   
 
To interpret Panel A:  coefficients in column (2) represent the total number of people who have 
been added to the workforce in a specific industry each year after 2003 due to the policy changes, 
where the industry in column (1) is always weighted as 1 (i.e. is the only industry in China). 
Columns (3) and (4) can be interpreted in the same way, where the coefficients represent the 
earnings and average earnings for workers in the industries in column (1), were each industry is 
separately weighted as 1. The coefficients only include insurance coverage that existed because of 
the policy change, and does not include the values for predicted coverage without the policy 
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change, which are associated with the variable Year interacted with provincial data. For these 
values, see Appendix B, Panel C. 
Most industries showed an overall increase in earnings (see Figure 5), 
though some industries were affected by the policy change more than others. 
Mining, real estate, and research all brought in significantly less income after 
2003, but experienced higher average earnings per worker. Construction, 
manufacturing, and social services showed the opposite effect: an increase in 
employment and earnings overall, but a decrease in average wages. These results 
were more or less expected, as greater competition for work in some industries let 
to lower wages and vice versa. However, a few industries did not follow this 
pattern. In addition to decreased employment, the farming industry also incurred 
decreased average wages, pointing to workers’ movements away from farming 
into more lucrative industries. The government, trade, and transportation 
industries showed an increase in employment as well as an increase in average 
wages. Government employees had by far the highest increase in average wages 
of all the industries experiencing job growth as a direct result of the 2003 policy 
changes.  Mining employees also earned unusually high average wages after 
2003, especially when compared to other “high risk”, labor intensive industries 
such as construction and farming (see Panel A tables 1 and 2).  
In addition to showing changes in employment and wages across 
industries, this study shows changes in insurance coverage and benefits before 
and after the policy change. Panel B shows the regression results from interacting 
Year2003 with industry shares for three key “high risk” industries: construction, 
mining, and manufacturing. It is clear from the regression results that insurance 
coverage increased considerably for construction workers and workers in 
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manufacturing. In fact, all of the industries that yielded job growth also exhibited 
substantial increases in insurance coverage for workers in those industries. 
Industries that experienced job loss exhibited comparable losses (if not gains) in 
insurance coverage per worker. The only exception to this pattern is farming, 
which showed a 40% decline in insurance coverage for the remaining workers in 
the industry.  
The remaining results of this regression are suggestive.  Recall from the 
“Data and Limitations” section of this paper that work-related injuries and 
diseases are measured using “insurance claims accepted” data gathered by the 
Chinese government. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether a change in 
the rate of claims acceptance is due to a change in insurance policy or to a change 
in the actual worker disease or injury rate.  These results are especially muddled 
when taking the 2003 trend break in employment into consideration, as we know 
that insurance policies were changing during that time. However, some of the 
regression results seem to substantiate qualitative studies that have been 
conducted on work-related disease. These findings may substantiate some 
qualitative research conducted by China Labour Bulletin, which recently 
published an in-depth report on pneumoconiosis (lung disease) in Chinese mining 
and manufacturing (The Hard Road).  Panel B, on page 21, shows that the 
insurance claims acceptance rates for work related diseases in mining and 
manufacturing have increased by .2% and .03% each year due to the effects of the 
2003 policy change. We can see in column (7) that the mining industry has had a 
statistically significant increase in claims acceptance for work related disease. In 
spite of the considerable drop in employment and insurance coverage for the 
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mining industry after 2003, miners continue to have their insurance claims 
accepted. These results were relatively surprising, as China’s largest insurers, 
such as China Life, usually require thorough medical documentation and proof of  
 
To interpret Panel B:  coefficients in column (2) represent the total number of people who have gained 
insurance coverage in a specific industry each year after 2003 due to the policy changes, where the 
industry in column (1) is always weighted as 1 (i.e. is the only industry in China). Columns (4) and (6) 
can be interpreted in the same way, where the coefficients represent the number of insurance claims 
that would be accepted for workers in construction, manufacturing, and mining if those industries were 
weighted as 1, respectively. The coefficients only include insurance coverage that existed because of 
the policy change, and does not include the values for predicted coverage without the policy change, 
which are associated with Year interacted with provincial data. For these values, see Appendix B, 
Panel D. 
Panel B: Provincial Regression Results; Year 2003 interacted with Industry Shares 
       
  Table 1: Selected  Industries (High Risk)   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Industry 
Total 
Workers Insurance Total Injury Injuries Total Disease Diseases 
 Insured per Worker Beneficiaries per Worker Beneficiaries per Worker 
       
Construction 27200000 -0.426 241348 0.0174 2444 -0.0001137 
 
(-
23000000) (-0.668) (147123)* (0.008)** (10086) (-0.002) 
       
Manufacturing 4788422 -0.3010201 20409 -0.0048 4482 0.0002535 
 
(-
14700000) (-0.358) (-92027) (-0.004) (6764) (-0.001) 
       
Mining  -6424960 0.2847294 -38551 0.0041 3091 0.0021054 
 (-9698050) (-0.401) (-55109) (-0.003) (3949) (0.001)*** 
       
R² 0.1029 0.5216 0.1151 0.4311 0.0674 0.2969 
       
Notes: 3 of 22 industries shown, R² was calculated using all 22 industries  
Constant term omitted 
Year interacted with industry shares omitted 
A “beneficiary” is someone who submitted a work-related injury or disease insurance claim and had their claim 
accepted. It does not include workers who did not report their accident or who had their claims request denied. 
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long-term employment before a worker will be compensated for medical 
treatment (Poon, LaMoshi).  Pneumoconiosis cases are especially difficult to 
claim on insurance or in court because lung disease can also be caused by  
smoking or pollution (China Insurance Regulatory Commission).  
Taking this information into consideration, it seems plausible that China 
Labour Bulletin is correct in saying that work-related diseases in mining may still 
be a growing problem in China, and that today’s miners are still in danger of 
acquiring pneumoconiosis.   
Similarly, insurance claims acceptance rates for work-related disease in 
manufacturing and work-related injuries in construction also increased each year 
after 2003.The injury and disease compensation rates for construction and 
manufacturing workers increased by an additional 2% and .002% (respectively) 
per year after 2003 due to the effects of the policy change. These results are fairly 
representative of the other provincial regression results. For example, there is 
evidence to support that the rising disease rate in manufacturing could be the 
result of the rising number of pneumoconiosis claims in the gemstone grinding 
industry (CLB), but it is also possible that more cases were accommodated by the 
increase in insurance coverage for manufacturing due to the 2003 policy changes.  
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Conclusions: 
 The bundle of policy changes enacted in 2003 seemed to have a significant 
impact on employment and average wages, while their impact on work-related 
injuries and disease is difficult to determine using the available data.  
The policy changes included significant Chinese market reform, which 
boosted employment and value added after 2003 (see Figure 4). The regression 
results reflected this overall increase in employment across most industries, with 
two notable exceptions in farming and mining. New technology in both mining 
and farming has replaced workers, though the result has been different for each 
industry. In mining, the remaining workers have taken on jobs that have higher 
value-added, resulting in higher wages. In farming, the reduction in both 
employees and wages lends evidence to other studies that confirm internal 
migration from western farmlands to eastern and central manufacturing and 
service jobs. The transportation and construction industries also experienced 
growth due to the 2003 policy change, which was likely a side effect of increased 
economic activity in other sectors (which may include accommodating migrants 
from the west).  The policy changes had the largest effect on social services 
employment, which grew more than any other industry. Though wages degreased 
for social services providers, this change was unmistakably the result of the 2003 
social welfare reform. Coincidentally, government workers received by far the 
highest increase in average wages due to the policy changes. 
Given the limitations of this study, it is difficult to interpret the impact of 
the policy changes on work-related injuries and illness without additional 
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information. However, there does seem to be some evidence (from both the 
regression results in this paper as well as others’ qualitative research) that mining 
seems to be growing more dangerous.  Pneumoconiosis, the leading work-related 
disease in China, is predicted to cost the country over 10 billion Yuan by 2020 
(Crandall).  The disease is easily prevented using means that are required under 
China’s current legal structure, which lends credence to an increase in workplace 
safety enforcement in mines across provinces.  
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Index A: Figures 
Figure 1: National Insurance Coverage 
 
Figure 2: National Employment (from sample data*) 
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Appendix A continued 
3: China’s national gross industrial output (in 1000 Yuan)
Industrial Value Added
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(in Yuan)
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Industrial Value-added*
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Appendix A continued 
 
            Figure 5: National Average Wages 
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Appendix B: Tables 
 
Panel A: Industry Regression Results; Year 2003 interacted with Industry Data 
     
Table 1: Selected  Industries (Employment Decrease)  
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
Industry Employees Earnings‡ Average   
      Earnings‡  
     
Farming -150738 -25300000 -10731  
 (12400000) (222000000) (10859)  
     
Mining  -3033669 -115000000 4017  
 (11800000) (213000000) (5229)  
     
R² 0.0375 0.0671 0.8028  
     
Table 2: Selected  Industries (Employment Increase)  
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
Industry Employees Earnings‡ Average   
      Earnings‡  
     
Construction 10700000 404000000 -1711  
 (29200000) (529000000) (12183)  
     
Social Services 33200000 1490000000 -11960  
 (123000000) (2250000000) (34253)  
     
Transportation 5848515 182000000 580  
 (33200000) (609000000) (14418)  
     
R² 0.0375 0.0671 0.8028  
     
Notes: 5 of 22 industries shown, R² was calculated using all 22 industries  
Constant term omitted     
Year interacted with industry shares omitted, Female Employees omitted 
‡ Earnings and Average Earnings are in Yuan; 1 Yuan ≈ 8 USD   
 
To interpret Panel A:  coefficients in column (2) represent the total number of people 
who have been added to the workforce in a specific industry each year after 2003 due 
to the policy changes, where the industry in column (1) is always weighted as 1 (i.e. is 
the only industry in China). Columns (3) and (4) can be interpreted in the same way, 
where the coefficients represent the earnings and average earnings for workers in the 
industries in column (1), were each industry is separately weighted as 1. The 
coefficients only include insurance coverage that existed because of the policy change, 
and does not include the values for predicted coverage without the policy change, 
which are associated with the variable Year interacted with provincial data.  For these 
values, see Appendix B, Panel C. 
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Appendix B continued 
 
To interpret Panel B:  coefficients in column (2) represent the total number of people who 
have gained insurance coverage in a specific industry each year after 2003 due to the 
policy changes, where the industry in column (1) is always weighted as 1 (i.e. is the only 
industry in China). Columns (4) and (6) can be interpreted in the same way, where the 
coefficients represent the number of insurance claims that would be accepted for workers 
in construction, manufacturing, and mining if those industries were weighted as 1, 
respectively. The coefficients only include insurance coverage that existed because of the 
policy change, and does not include the values for predicted coverage without the policy 
change, which are associated with Year interacted with provincial data. For these values, 
see Appendix B, Panel D. 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Provincial Regression Results; Year 2003 interacted with Industry Shares 
       
  Table 1: Selected  Industries (High Risk)   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Industry Total Workers Insurance Total Injury Injuries 
Total 
Disease Diseases 
 Insured per Worker Beneficiaries per Worker Beneficiaries per Worker 
       
Construction 27200000 -0.426 241348 0.0174 2444 -0.0001137 
 (-23000000) (-0.668) (147123)* (0.008)** (10086) (-0.002) 
       
Manufacturing 4788422 -0.3010201 20409 -0.0048 4482 0.0002535 
 (-14700000) (-0.358) (-92027) (-0.004) (6764) (-0.001) 
       
Mining  -6424960 0.2847294 -38551 0.0041 3091 0.0021054 
 (-9698050) (-0.401) (-55109) (-0.003) (3949) (0.001)*** 
       
R² 0.1029 0.5216 0.1151 0.4311 0.0674 0.2969 
       
Notes: 3 of 22 industries shown, R² was calculated using all 22 industries  
Constant term omitted 
Year interacted with industry shares omitted 
A “beneficiary” is someone who submitted a work-related injury or disease insurance claim and had their claim  
accepted. It does not include workers who did not report their accident or who had their claims request denied. 
*** Significant at 1% Level ** Significant at 5% Level * Significant at 10% Level 
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Appendix B continued 
 
Panel C: Industry Regression Results  
      
Table 1: All Industries; Year 2003 interacted with Industry Data 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
  Employees Female  Earnings‡ Average  
   Employees  Earnings 
      
Agencies  -4454737 -3325537 -446000 -3806 
  (31100000) (11600000) (568000) (8465) 
      
Construction 10700000 3206773 404000 -1711 
  (29200000) (11000000) (529000) (12183) 
      
Farming  -150737.5 -929183 -25300 -10731 
  (12400000) (4606003) (222000) (10859) 
      
Government 8167963 3221890 582000 9967 
  (41400000) (15700000) (764000) (12389) 
      
Institutions -5766017 -3553792 -455000 -2869 
  (39100000) (14600000) (704000000) (9592) 
      
Manufacturing 3890472 1203146 180000 -4988 
  (17200000) (6498276) (320000) (4846) 
      
Mining   -3033669 -1865297 -115000 4017 
  (11800000) (4354442) (213000) (5229) 
      
Real Estate -119000000 -51000000 -5680000 174943 
  (560000000) (208000000) (10200000) (139081) 
      
Research  -25600000 -14100000 -1150000 24531 
  (75900000) (27600000) (1370000) (24219) 
      
Social 
Services 33200000 14200000 1490000 -11960 
  (123000000) (45400000) (2250000) (34253) 
      
Trade  655752.3 322555.4 329000 6374 
  (36200000) (13500000) (679000) (16595) 
      
Transportation 5848515 89505.58 182000 580 
  (33200000) (12700000) (609000) (14418) 
      
Constant  8.61E+08 -6.27E+08 -9780000 -2692999 
  (1570000000) (482000000) (17200) (199377)**** 
      
R²  0.0375 0.0415 0.0671 0.8028 
      
‡ Earnings and Standard Errors are in 1000 Yuan 
*** Significant at 1% Level ** Significant at 5% Level * Significant at 10% Level 
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Appendix B continued 
 
Panel C: Industry Regression Results 
      
Table 2: All Industries; Year interacted with Industry Data 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
  Employees Female  Earnings‡ Average  
   Employees  Earnings 
      
Agencies  -473965.3 297980.9 4443 1347 
  (786787) (239823) (8564) (99)**** 
      
Construction -403117.5 323549.1 5222 1358 
  (780105) (242178) (8657) (100)**** 
      
Farming  -422468 316616.5 4933 1340 
  (781933) (241472) (8630) (100)**** 
      
Government -369326.9 335034 5536 1374 
  (778086) (243088) (8692) (102)**** 
      
Institutions -475442.7 296493.1 4384 1331 
  (787850) (239506) (8551) (98)**** 
      
Manufacturing -408234.1 321666.7 5116 1350 
  (781234) (241719) (8641) (100)**** 
      
Mining   -432994.8 311611 4805 1342 
  (784036) (240668) (8599) (99)**** 
      
Real Estate -972809.7 105441.3 -64814 1494 
  (899249) (248912) (8482) (117)**** 
      
Research  -515554.5 280117.6 3902 1349 
  (789963) (239637) (8543) (100)**** 
      
Social Services -315101.3 358658.4 6151 1357 
  (774405) (246489) (8811) (101)**** 
      
Trade  -383774.8 328148.4 5359 1356 
  (780634) (242055) (8653) (101)**** 
      
Transportation -417520 319088.4 5058 1358 
  (779814) (242354) (8664) (101)**** 
      
      
Constant  8.61E+08 -6.27E+08 -9780000 -2692999 
  (1570000000) (482000000) (17200) (199377)**** 
      
R²  0.0375 0.0415 0.0671 0.8028 
      
‡ Earnings and Standard Errors are in 1000 Yuan 
*** Significant at 1% Level ** Significant at 5% Level * Significant at 10% Level 
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Panel B: Provincial Regression Results; Year 2003 interacted with Industry Shares 
       
Table 1: Selected  Industries (High Risk) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Total 
Workers  Insurance Total Injury Injuries  
Total 
Disease Diseases 
 Insured  per Worker Beneficiaries per Worker 
 
Beneficiaries per Worker 
       
Agencies -1.04E+07 0.80 -28325 0.0189 856 0.0028192 
 (24900000) (.677) (146954) (0.009)** 12119 (0.001)* 
       
Construction 2.72E+07 -4.26E-01 241348 0.0174 2444 -0.0001137 
 (23000000) (.668) (147123)* (0.008)** 10086 (.002) 
       
Farming -2445395 -0.4014718 -65731 -0.0145 3122 -0.0000847 
 (10700000) (.52) (62809) (0.004)**** 5764 (.001) 
       
Government -1723871 -1.547196 -8517 -0.0134 4899 -0.0010692 
 (36000000) (1.053) (215679) (.011) 23562 (.003) 
       
Institutions -695441.7 0.4010938 -5491 0.0091 -3394 -0.0003908 
 (33200000) (.884) (196355) (.007) 18595 (.002) 
       
Manufacturing 4788422 -0.3010201 20409 -0.0048 4482 0.0002535 
 (14700000) (.358) (92027) (.004) 6764 (.001) 
       
Mining  -6424960 0.2847294 -38551 0.0041 3091 0.0021054 
 (9698050) (.401) (55109) (.003) 3949 (0.001)*** 
       
Real Estate -2.51E+08 24.86 -1232767 0.184 -11295 0.0363514 
 (442000000) (11.5)** (2849451) (.128) 201346 (.027) 
       
Research -8.16E+07 3.47 -789131 -0.0389 1584 0.0083747 
 (61500000) (1.94) (401845)* (.026) 31584 (.005) 
       
Social Services 6.85E+07 -6.57 494759 -0.0107 3050 -0.0086826 
 (97800000) (2.5)*** (646892) (.029) 44587 (.006) 
       
Trade 6305116 1.488779 -25675 -0.0205 -5329 -0.0031245 
 (31300000) (1.191) (206708) (.016) 15155 -(.003) 
       
Transportation 4243578 0.6255502 -3414 -0.0067 -13785 -0.0016419 
 (28500000) (1.121) (172657) (.009) 13572 (.002) 
       
Constant -1.60E+08 -54.3891 -4993253 -0.639039 -637329.4 -0.1009372 
 9.47E+08 28.45747 5293759 0.2610069 539192.4 0.0354863 
       
R² 0.1029 0.5216 0.1151 0.4311 0.0674 0.2969 
 
*** Significant at 1% Level ** Significant at 5% Level * Significant at 10% Level 
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Appendix B continued 
Panel B: Provincial Regression Results; Year 2003 interacted with Industry Shares 
       
Table 1: Selected  Industries (High Risk) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Total 
Workers  Insurance Total Injury Injuries  
Total 
Disease Diseases 
 Insured  per Worker Beneficiaries per Worker 
 
Beneficiaries per Worker 
       
Agencies 63396.41 0.027188 2512.586 0.0003 318 0.0000524 
 (471624) (.014) (2621) (0.0001)** 267 (0.0000)*** 
       
Construction 76809.26 0.0265989 2476.722 0.0003 322 0.0000505 
 (473924) (0.014)* (2649) (0.0001)** 270 (0.0001)*** 
       
Farming 82657.42 0.0281115 2497.657 0.0003 326 0.0000521 
 (474204) (0.014)** (2654) (0.0001)** 270 (0.0000)*** 
       
Government 134071.5 0.0284402 2679.298 0.0003 325 0.0000487 
 (477915) (0.015)* (2702) (0.0001)** 278 (0.0000)*** 
       
Institutions 30900.98 0.0258064 2234.72 0.0003 304 0.0000507 
 (469993) (.014) (2599) (0.0001)** 262 (0.0000)*** 
       
Manufacturing 93650.39 0.0280536 2579.653 0.0003 330 0.0000517 
 (474641) (0.014)* (2660) (0.0001)** 271 (0.0000)*** 
       
Mining  75123.73 0.025889 2477.802 0.0003 318 0.0000503 
 (473001) (.014) (2641) (0.0001)** 269 (0.0000)*** 
       
Real Estate 74496.9 0.0319059 3260.408 0.0005 230 0.0000536 
 (474233) (0.015)** (2549) (0.0002)*** 252 (0.0000)** 
       
Research 59446.26 0.0200502 2408.276 0.0003 316 0.0000507 
 (473223) (.014) (2653) (0.0001)** 272 (0.0000)*** 
       
Social Services 90256.3 0.0307421 2476.947 0.0003 342 0.000052 
 (477771) (0.014)** (2692) (0.0001)** 274 (0.0000)*** 
       
Trade 111665 0.0277701 2514.399 0.0003 309 0.0000465 
 (475849) (0.015)* (2673) (0.0001)** 272 (0.0000)*** 
       
Transportation 102688 2.86E-02 2667.895 0.0003 322 0.0000491 
 (476219) (0.014)** (2675) (0.0001)** 274 (0.0000)*** 
       
       
Constant -1.60E+08 -54.389 -4993253 -0.639 -637329 -0.101 
 (947000000) (28) (5293759) (0.0001)** 539192 (0.0355)*** 
       
R² 0.1029 0.5216 0.1151 0.4311 0.0674 0.2969 
 
*** Significant at 1% Level ** Significant at 5% Level * Significant at 10% Level 
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Summary 
 
This paper seeks to determine the effect of domestic job growth on work-
related injuries and diseases in Mainland China. Some experts argue that China as 
a whole suffers from the health hazards and work-related injuries that have 
become prevalent where labor law enforcement is uneven or even non-existent 
(Crandall). NGOs and labor rights activists suggest that heightened labor law 
enforcement will increase both workplace safety and private insurance coverage 
for workers, which are mandated by law in most provinces.  Over the past decade, 
the PRC has made dramatic changes to its labor contract laws, corporate laws, and 
social welfare system in an effort to improve workers' wellbeing and decrease the 
impact of rights violations on the public healthcare system and national budget. 
 In 2003, changes in marketplace behavior, corporate law, and enterprise 
management policy led to rapid growth in employment, wages, and insurance 
coverage (see Figures 1-5). The econometric model described in this paper 
measures whether workers’ compensation for injuries and diseases incurred at 
work increased overall due to this policy change. More specifically, it measures 
the exact effect of the policy changes on employment, wages, insurance coverage, 
and work related injury/disease rates between 2003 and 2006. In other words, the 
model predicts what would have happened to employment, wages, and injuries if 
there hadn’t been a policy change, and reports them as the variable Year. Then the 
model measures the difference between Year and what really happened, which is 
reported as Year2003. The regression results for Year 2003 represent the exact 
statistical effect of the policy changes.  
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The policy changes included significant Chinese market reform, which 
boosted employment and value added after 2003 (see Figure 4). The regression 
results reflected this overall increase in employment across most industries, with 
two notable exceptions in farming and mining. New technology in both mining 
and farming has replaced workers, though the result has been different for each 
industry. In mining, the remaining workers have taken on jobs that have higher 
value-added, resulting in higher wages. In farming, the reduction in both 
employees and wages lends evidence to other studies that confirm internal 
migration from western farmlands to eastern and central manufacturing and 
service jobs. The transportation and construction industries also experienced 
growth due to the 2003 policy change, which was likely a side effect of increased 
economic activity in other sectors (which may include accommodating migrants 
from the west).  The policy changes had the largest effect on social services 
employment, which grew more than any other industry. Though wages degreased 
for social services providers, this change was unmistakably the result of the 2003 
social welfare reform. Coincidentally, government workers received by far the 
highest increase in average wages due to the policy changes while non-
government social services employees suffered from pay cuts. 
I found evidence that suggests that the workers’ insurance coverage 
improved overall due to the policy changes, and that a greater number of workers 
are being compensated for injuries and illnesses incurred at work. Though a 
smaller proportion of workers are insured, more workers are receiving 
compensation. I also found that workers in the mining industry are paid 
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disproportionately low wages considering their risk of disease. This points to 
either dishonest firms or undereducated employees.  
One of my most interesting findings concerns the mining industry, and 
concerns labor law enforcement directly. Some of the regression results seem to 
substantiate qualitative studies that have been conducted on work-related disease. 
These findings may substantiate some qualitative research conducted by China 
Labour Bulletin, which recently published an in-depth report on pneumoconiosis 
(lung disease) in Chinese mining and manufacturing (The Hard Road).  Panel B, 
on page 21, shows that the insurance claims acceptance rates for work related 
diseases in mining and manufacturing have increased by .2% and .03% each year 
due to the effects of the 2003 policy change. We can see in column (7) that the 
mining industry has had a statistically significant increase in claims acceptance 
for work related disease. In spite of the considerable drop in employment and 
insurance coverage for the mining industry after 2003, miners continue to have 
their insurance claims accepted. These results were relatively surprising, as 
China’s largest insurers, such as China Life, usually require thorough medical 
documentation and proof of long-term employment before a worker will be 
compensated for medical treatment (Poon, LaMoshi).  Pneumoconiosis cases are 
especially difficult to claim on insurance or in court because lung disease can also 
be caused by smoking or pollution (China Insurance Regulatory Commission).  
Taking this information into consideration, it seems plausible that China 
Labour Bulletin is correct in saying that work-related diseases in mining may still 
be a growing problem in China, and that today’s miners are still in danger of 
acquiring pneumoconiosis.   
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Given the limitations of this study, it is difficult to interpret the remainder 
of my work-related illness and disease results. However, there does seem to be 
some evidence (from both the regression results in this paper as well as others’ 
qualitative research) that mining seems to be growing more dangerous.  
Pneumoconiosis, the leading work-related disease in China, is predicted to cost 
the country over 10 billion Yuan by 2020 (Crandall).  The disease is easily 
prevented using means that are required under China’s current legal structure, 
which lends credence to an increase in workplace safety enforcement in mines 
across provinces.  
The Chinese government has made exceptional progress over the last 30 
years. The Chinese have agreed to follow basic ILO labor mandates, and the 
legislature has passed adequate legislature in order to protect its workers at a 
minimal level. Unfortunately, the enforcement of these laws continues to fall 
short, and hundreds of thousands of Chinese laborers remain without adequate 
pay, health benefits, and working conditions (Hard Road). Bao Hua, a factory 
auditor, tells us that brand auditing, police services, and other labor law 
enforcement mechanisms are often rendered useless by corruption. Conducting 
quantitative studies (such as this one) is important in helping to track the progress 
and success of Chinese efforts to improve labor conditions, and to measure the 
economic costs of allowing laws to continue to go unenforced. 
The province and industry-level data used in this experiment was collected 
by the Chinese Bureau of Statistics, and provides information on employment, 
wages, and insurance from 30 provinces between 1998 and 2007.  The results 
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exclude Chinese territories, including Macau and Hong Kong, and do not 
encompass the effects of the current economic crisis. 
 
 
 
